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Abstract
Brazil’s Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) is a potentially promising avenue to slow deforestation
on private properties as it facilitates the monitoring of land use. Yet limited empirical evidence exists
on how the CAR affects smallholders’ behavior and recent scholarly efforts have in fact indicated that
it may be doing less to protect forests than previously assumed. Based on 1177 smallholder surveys
conducted in the Cerrado, we assess 1) whether the CAR might incentivize smallholders to pursue
deforestation and 2) which factors are associated with smallholders’ intended deforestation behavior.
We find that upon CAR registration, factors significantly associated with smallholders’ intention to
deforest are: the existing percentage of native vegetation on the property, the use of agricultural loans,
property owner’s age, and livestock production experience. To curb deforestation that may follow
expressed intentions of smallholders, the CAR, and environmental registration programs alike,
should account for existing land use by, for example, improving the system already in place for
trading areas of native vegetation as this system is not widely adopted by those smallholders with
more native vegetation than the legal cut-off. Also, such programs should assess the role of whether
conditions related to land cover maintenance may protect against deforestation if credit access is
supported especially to younger smallholders and/or livestock producers with a high percentage of
native vegetation in their properties.
1. Introduction
Brazil’s newForest Code from2012 (Republic of Brazil,
Federal Law 12,615/2012) has been heavily criticized as
it relaxed the previous code from 1965 (Kro¨ger 2017).
For example, the new law granted amnesty to ‘small or
family farms’5; who deforested more than their legal
5 Landholdings up to four fiscalmodules. Thefiscalmodule (mo´dulo
fiscal) is a land unit established by the National Institute of Colo-
nization and Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Colonizac¸a˜o
e Reforma Agra´ria, INCRA) mainly for rural real estate taxation
according to FederalDecreeN◦ 8.485/1980 and INCRANI◦ 20/1980.
A smallholder (e.g., family landholder and rural family entrepreneur)
is onewho carries out activities in rural areas, simultaneouslymeeting
limit before 2008 and it reduced reforestation require-
ments by approximately 60%, albeit more than 20
million hectares of ‘forest debt’ remained unforgiven
(Soares-Filho et al 2014, Soares-Filho et al 2016). Cur-
rently, there are many legislative proposals circulating
the following requirements: (i) he or she does not hold, in any capac-
ity, an area of above four fiscal modules; (ii) he or shemostly uses the
manual labor of his or her own family in the economic activities of his
or her establishment or undertaking; (iii) he or she has a minimum
percentage of household income arising from economic activities
of his or her establishment or enterprise, i.e. those defined by the
Executive Authority (wording of Law No 12.512 of 2011 (Republic
of Brazil 2011)); and (iv) he or she directs his or her establishment
or undertaking with his or her family (Law 11.326/2006 (Republic of
Brazil 2006)).
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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in the Brazilian Congress, which aim to weaken the
country’s environmental regulations, thereby encour-
aging rapid development of energy facilities, mines and
agriculture (Tollefson 2016). One proposed consti-
tutional amendment would, for example, essentially
eliminate government review by replacing standard
environmental licensing procedures with a quicker,
more flexible system in which different Brazilian states,
can decide which licenses agribusiness projects should
have. Because of these anti-environmental initiatives,
concerns are rising about Brazil’s globally significant,
carbon-rich, and biodiverse forests (Fearnside 2015,
Fearnside 2016, Ferreira et al 2014). Yet, a potentially
promising mechanism of Brazil’s new Forest Code is
theCadastro Ambiental Rural (the Rural Environmen-
tal Registry—CAR) program (Soares-Filho et al 2014,
Newton et al 2016). The CAR requires geo-referencing
of property boundaries as well as Legal Reserves (LR)
and Areas of Permanent Preservation (APP) which
are mandatory private areas protected by the Brazilian
Forest Code and play an important role in environ-
mental conservation. The immediate goal of this type
of environmental property registry is to reveal and sys-
tematize information about land use within properties
for the purposes of monitoring and planning (Vital
2016). It aims ultimately to improve both agricultural
and environmental outcomes in Brazil and, through
example, elsewhere (Cavaglia-Harris et al 2016, Shank-
land and Goncalves 2016). With the expectations of
positive ecological outcomes of the CAR assuming
improved monitoring through the use of CAR data
(Jung et al 2017) and because the CAR is consequential
at a global scale due to Brazil’s sheer size, interna-
tional funding, originating from donors such as the
International Climate Fund (ICF) and the German
Development Bank, has been directed to its implemen-
tation. The initial deadline for CAR registration was
extended from May 2015 to May 2017 by the Brazil-
ianMinistry of Environment—primarily because of the
low registration rates.
Although the success of the CAR is critical to
environmental conservation as it leverages the avail-
ability of satellite imagery to allow for monitoring and
enforcement of the Forest Code as well as other envi-
ronmental legislations, limited scholarly attention has
been devoted to understanding the outcomes of its
nationwide implementation, partly because the imple-
mentation is still ongoing. A few exceptions do exist.
These studies address state-specific implementation of
the CAR. One such exception is L’Roe et al (2016)
who evaluate the initial outcomes of the CAR in the
state of Para´ in the Amazon and find that there is no
effect on registrants’ deforestation behavior except for a
significant reduction in deforestation on ‘smallholder’
properties in the size range of 100–300 ha. Another
example is Azevedo et al (2014) who likewise find a
significant reduction in deforestation in Para´ andMato
Grosso for smallholder properties of up to four fiscal
modules. For properties between four and 15modules,
a reduction in deforestation was only observed in Para´
and for proprieties with more than 15 fiscal modules
the effects of the CAR on deforestation were unclear
(Azevedo et al 2014). Therefore, although the CAR is
one of the largest environmental management systems
in the world and covers millions of hectares of for-
est across Brazil’s six biomes, there is limited evidence
of its impact on landholders’ behavior and a better,
more expansive understanding of how the CAR may
affect deforestation behavior is needed. The success of
CAR is globally important and lessons learned from
its implementation will be of interest to many other
countries experiencing similar land use issues.
In this paper, we examine how the CAR might
incentivize smallholders to forego deforestation or per-
versely, to increase it.Wenote that this study is designed
to evaluate how CAR registration might affect expected
deforestation behavior, which could be different from
the actual behavior. We do so by using primary sur-
vey data of 1177 smallholders across 11 municipalities
in the states of Bahia and Piauı´ in the Cerrado biome.
We focus on smallholders and these two states for two
reasons. First, they represent past deforestation trends
in the Cerrado biome (on the order of 6500 km2 in
2010 (Beuchle et al 2015)). Second, ICF has actively
engaged with smallholders’ CAR registration in the 11
sample municipalities. Our data enables us to advance
understandings of smallholders’ intended deforesta-
tion behavior following CAR registration. This study
is an initial attempt to disentangle the factors that
are linked to smallholders’ deforestation intentions
and behaviors in the context of CAR using micro-
level data. The Cerrado is a particularly interesting
case because large parts of the biome is referred to
as Brazil’s newest agricultural hotspot—about half of
the biome has been converted for agricultural produc-
tion in recent decades (MMA 2009, Jepson et al 2010,
Gibbs et al 2015a, Strassburg et al 2017) causing sub-
stantial carbon emissions (Noojipady et al 2017). Also,
the Cerrado has less protection than Amazon forests
in the Forest Code in terms of the amount of native
vegetation to be preserved within private landholdings
(Federal Law 12,615/2012) despite having some of the
world’smostbiodiverse savannahs (Carranzaet al2013,
Oliveira 2013).
2. A potentially promisingmechanism of the
new Forest Code: the CAR
The Forest Code sets mandatory caps on the propor-
tion of native vegetation that can be legally cleared on
any rural property. In the Legal Amazon, 80% of pri-
vate holdings must be preserved as LRs, whereas for
properties in Cerrado areas within the Legal Amazon,
the native vegetation must constitute 35%. Outside of
the Legal Amazon, 20% of native vegetation needs to
be maintained although some state laws stipulate an
increased percentage.
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The CAR became a nationwide and mandatory
endeavor after the revision of the Forest Code (Soares-
Filho et al 2014). Initially, CAR registration was a
voluntary process with state-specific systems, each with
somewhat different procedures but with high expec-
tations within Brazil and among the international
environmental community for the potential to slow
deforestation (Fearnside 2003). For example, in the
state of Para´ implementation began in 2008 (L’Roe et al
2016) and inMatoGrosso the System for Environmen-
tal Licensing (LAU)6, which is a part of the Land Zone
Planning System (Portuguese acronym: SLAPR) was
implemented from the early 1990s, albeit not involving
CAR until 2009 (Azevedo and Saito 2013).
TheCAR is expected to easemonitoring of farmers’
deforestation behavior because it links landowners to
land use on a particular property (Gibbs et al 2015a).
As such, the CAR is intended to be a transparent mech-
anism for evaluating compliance with the Forest Code
and thereby achieving improved environmental out-
comes (Gibbs et al 2015b). While farmers with less
native vegetation than the legal requirements must
reforest to achieve compliance with the Forest Code,
there is also a risk that those farmers with more native
vegetation than the legal cut-off see the Forest Code as
permission to deforest up to the legal limit, or theymay
attempt to subvert the system by registering a lower
percentage of native vegetation than what they actually
have, enabling them to subsequently clear (Raja˜o et al
2012, Azevedo and Saito 2013). Yet, the Environmen-
tal Reserve Quota (Portuguese acronym: CRA) aims to
prevent such situations by creating an incentive to reg-
ister the full percentage. That is, the CRA system allows
property owners with more native vegetation than the
legal requirements to be paid formaintaining the excess
area by other property owners with less native vegeta-
tion than the legal cut-off (Soares-Filho et al 2016).
Other problems related to CAR registration include
extensive overlaps in terms of the registered property
area (Barros et al 2016, Moreira 2016, Pires 2013)
and lack of validation of self-declared registrations
(Pires 2013).
3. Methods
3.1. Study sites and smallholder survey
Data collection was carried out from April to July 2016
across two states, Bahia and Piauı´. We focused on
11 municipalities in which the ICF provided support
for CAR implementation. Two firms (Ambientagro
in Bahia and Projetos in Piauı´) helped smallhold-
ers geo-reference properties and prepare the required
documents for registration. As state governments are
6 To obtain LAU, onehad to prove compliancewith the Forest Code,
which is different from the CAR that does not require compliance a
priori registration.
compelled by law to assist smallholders with CAR
registration, third-partydonor agencieshavebeen facil-
itating thisprocess inmost states.Werandomly selected
our survey respondents from the list of smallholders
who had registered for the CAR with the help of tech-
nicians from theProCerradoprogramsupported by the
ICF.
We define smallholders based on a standard def-
inition in Brazilian land policy5 (Republic of Brazil,
Federal Law 8629/1993) which is also used in other
studies (e.g. L’Roe et al 2016): properties up to four
fiscal modules. Fiscal module sizes vary across munic-
ipalities in Brazil as a fiscal module is a size unit
defined for each municipality according to the amount
of land required for the primary economic activi-
ties of that region (Republic of Brazil, Federal Decree
84,685/1980). The fiscal module in Cerrado munic-
ipalities is on average 46 ha. For the five sampled
municipalities in Bahia, a fiscal model equals 65 ha,
while it equals 70 ha for three of the six sampled
municipalities in Piauı´ (Santa Filomena, Currais, and
Palmeira) and 75 ha for the remaining (Uruc¸ui, Baixa
Grande do Ribeiro, and Ribeiro Gonc¸alves). Thus, for
the studiedmunicipalities, small properties are less than
260 ha in Bahia and 280–300 ha in Piauı´. Moreover,
in the state of Piauı´, state regulations stipulate that
the amount of native vegetation that needs to be pre-
served constitute 30% of property areas rather than
20% as mandated by the Forest Code (Federal Law
12,615/2012).
In-person surveyswere conductedwith 1177 small-
holders (n= 851 across fivemunicipalities in Bahia and
n=326 across sixmunicipalities in Piauı´). Less than 1%
of respondents refused to participate in our survey and
therefore the bias from non-response would not signif-
icantly change our results. The primarily quantitative
survey included questions on household characteris-
tics, income and expenditures, agricultural production,
problems and opportunities associated with CAR
registration, and intended behavioral changes imme-
diately following CAR registration. Specific questions
addressed what those smallholders with more native
vegetation than the legal cut-off intended to dowith the
excess area. Semi-structured interviews were also con-
ducted with a subset of randomly selected smallholders
(20 in Bahia and 22 in Piauı´) that also participated in
the quantitative survey. The aimof the interviewswas to
provide additional information on behavioral changes
in the months following CAR registration.
We first present descriptive statistics from our sur-
vey data to illustrate (a) how many smallholders have,
according to self-declarations, more or less than the
legally required LR area and (b) how smallholders
intend to use the excessive LR area. Then we construct
a binary response model to identify characteristics of
those smallholders who plan to clear excessive vege-
tation areas for cultivation. This model is explained
in detail in the following section. As smallholders are
the unit of analysis, changes in expected deforestation
3
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behavior onpropertieswithdifferent sizes (≤ four fiscal
modules) count equally.As such, this approach informs
us about the type of farmers who are more likely to
deforest following CAR registration rather than how
much deforestation the program may initiate.
3.2. Modeling smallholder characteristics associated
with deforestation behavior
We investigate the factors associatedwith smallholders’
expected deforestation behavior following CAR regis-
tration using the probit regression model. The model
is based on our survey and interview data and exist-
ing literature on smallholder decision-making (e.g.
Angelsen 1999), which assumes that a smallholder
maximizes utility from consumption and leisure,
and is constrained by labor quantity. That is, each
smallholder’s decision to clear native vegetation is a
function of factors affecting both consumption and
production. We include biophysical and socioeco-
nomic variables (for a full list, see table S1 available
at stacks.iop.org/ERL/12/094001/mmedia) and run the
model to investigate which factors are highly associ-
ated with smallholders’ likelihood of clearing the native
vegetation area on their property:
Pr(𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 1) = 𝜃(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑁𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖)
where Cleari is a dummy variable indicating whether
a smallholder i plans to clear his/her native vegetation
cover (Cleari =1)ornot (Cleari =0);𝜃 is the cumulative
normal distribution; NV𝑖 is the percentage of native
vegetation cover in smallholder i’s property; Prod𝑖 is a
vector of variables that affect production decisions; X𝑖
is a vector of other demographic and socioeconomic
control variables. We use a robust clustered variance-
covariance matrix to account for correlations within 18
districts in the 11municipalities. We run the model (a)
with all observations and (b) with those observations
for which the amount of native vegetation in properties
is above the legal cut-off.
Ideally, we would have a control group of small-
holders who are not registering for the CAR and which
we could compare with our survey respondents’ defor-
estation behavior in order to find a causal relationship
between CAR registration and deforestation behav-
iors. However, given that the CAR registration is a
nationwide policy and most of the properties are being
registered with little variation in timing it was not fea-
sible to construct such a control group. Because of the
absence of adequate control groups, our survey ques-
tions asked specifically about respondents’ changes in
land use as a result of CAR registration to investigate
smallholders’ changes in their deforestation behaviors.
Specifically, we asked all respondents: ‘Do you antici-
pate making any changes in the way you use your land
after you have registered for the CAR? If so, what are
they?’ Also, we asked those respondents who had more
native vegetation than the legal requirements: ‘Since
more than the legally-required area of your land is
native vegetation (Legal Reserves), what do you plan
to do with the excess area?’7. With this study design,
the findings from the above model can be interpreted
as smallholder characteristics that are highly associated
with expected deforestation behavior change as a result
of CAR registration.
4. Results
4.1. Deforestation trends among smallholders
To illuminate smallholders’8 intended deforestation
behavior following CAR registration, we first assessed
whether the proportion of native vegetation smallhold-
ers had on their properties prior to CAR registration
wasbeloworabove the legal cut-off.We found that 31%
(n=260)of the surveyedsmallholders inBahia reported
a native vegetation proportion higher than the legal
cut-off of 20%. In Piauı´, 89% reported values higher
than the legal cut-off of 30%. Of those respondents
who had more native vegetation than the legal require-
ments, 36% in Bahia and 41% in Piauı´ reported that
they intended to clear the excess area and begin culti-
vating the land. Only one respondent intended tomake
use of the CRA system for trading excess areas of native
vegetation. The main reasons for the lack of participa-
tion in the CRA system were a lack of knowledge about
the system and how to utilize it.Most respondents with
an excess area of native vegetation, however, did not
intend to alter their deforestation behavior following
(or preceding) CAR registration (63% in Bahia and
58% in Piauı´). Our semi-structured interviews indi-
cated that lack of resources (e.g. money, labor) as well
as a sufficient cultivation area were the main reasons
for not clearing more land. Yet, if smallholders were
to gain additional financial resources, they would likely
clear more native vegetation.
A histogram of the self-declared native vegetation
proportion (figure 1) reveals a high frequency of the
self-reported native vegetation proportion in Bahia at
the legal cut-off of 20%. Because many smallholders
actually did not know their proportion of native veg-
etation prior to CAR registration, they adhered to the
proportion recorded when they registered for the CAR
which, according to all interviewees, would not fall
above the legal cut-off. This indicates that a ‘rounded’
estimate of 20% might be an under-estimate and that
the number of smallholders who plan to clear native
vegetation may be even higher. In Piauí, respondents
seemed more aware of the proportion of native veg-
etation on their properties prior to CAR registration
and a dense distribution was observed around values
7 We acknowledge that clearing of excess area is legally permitted
as long as the required percentage of LR and APP is maintained.
Our intention is to investigate smallholders’ intended deforestation
behaviors regardless of whether it is legal or not.
8 Main crops produced by respondents were maize, bean, and cas-
sava, and 23% of respondents owned cattle.
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Figure 1. Histograms of self-declared native vegetation percentages on properties of smallholders prior to CAR registration (n = 851
in Bahia, n = 326 in Piauı´).
of 80%–100% native vegetation with more than half of
the surveyed smallholders fallingwithin this range. This
conforms to the view that preservation of native vege-
tation has generally been more pronounced in Piauí as
compared to Bahia (Sano et al 2010).
4.2. Smallholder characteristics associated with
deforestation behavior
We turn next to an explicit examination of the fac-
tors associated with smallholders’ intended change
in land use behavior following CAR registration
(table S1). First, we found that a high percentage
of existing native vegetation cover on smallholders’
properties was positively associated with smallholders’
intendeddeforestationbehavior afterCAR registration,
controlling for all other observed biophysical, socioe-
conomic, and demographic variables. The calculated
averagemarginal effect of onepercentage increase in the
native vegetation cover on the likelihood of deforesta-
tion was 0.52% across all observations. Analogously,
the simulation results, using the same model showed
that one standard deviation (29.5%) increase in the
percentage of native vegetation cover in smallholders’
property area from the average percentage of native
vegetation cover (40.2%) increased the probabil-
ity of deforestation by 23% across all observations
(figure 2(a)). Similar patterns and magnitude hold
when using only those observations for which the
amount of native vegetation in properties was above
the legal cut-off. The greater percentage of native veg-
etation cover a smallholder had on the property, the
higher the likelihood of clearing. This indicates that
clearing would more likely occur in those areas with
relatively high percentage of native vegetation cover.
We also found that smallholders who had used
loans for agricultural purposes in the previous year
were more likely to deforest after CAR registration
(figure 2(b)), which is consistent with Pfaff (1999) and
Hargrave and Kis-Katos (2012) who found a positive
correlation between credit use and deforestation in the
Brazilian Amazon. That CAR registrationwill be one of
the requirements to access rural credit lines inBrazilwas
reflected in our survey data: 15% of respondents men-
tioned credit access as one of major reasons for CAR
registration, secondhighest to thecompliancewith legal
requirements. Because our semi-structured interviews
revealed that many smallholders considered the lack of
funds as a constraint in clearing land for cultivation
and expected to use funds from increased credit access
for land clearings, it raises concerns that smallholders
without credit access may be granted access through
CAR registration as this may fuel further deforestation.
Livestock production experience and smallholder
age were also factors highly associated with intended
deforestation behavior at the 5% level of significance.
The more livestock production experience smallhold-
ers have and the younger they are (figure 2(c)), themore
likely they are to clear native vegetation. The positive
associationwith livestock experiencemayarise fromthe
importance of pastures for livestock and the vast expan-
sion of pastures into forested areas seen across Brazil
during the past decades (Cederberg et al 2011). With
regards to the importance of age, our semi-structured
interviews indicated that younger smallholders are bet-
ter able and more willing to clear native vegetation
due to better health and higher prospects for returns.
Yet, the use of rural credit for agricultural purposes
appeared more important than the age of smallholders
(figure 2(d)). That is, only smallholders in the youngest
age group, who had not used rural credit lines, have a
greater likelihood of clearing than those smallholders
in the oldest age group who had used rural credit lines.
5. Discussion
Whereas Brazil can celebrate reductions in the large-
scale clearingof forest in theAmazon, ourfindings from
the Cerrado biome indicate that clearings are likely
to happen at the property level, threatening some of
the world’s most biodiverse savannahs. As we show
how the process of CAR registration might incen-
tivize clearing for cultivation among those smallholders
with more native vegetation than the legal cut-off, our
results indicate that current conservation initiatives in
the Cerrado might not be sufficient to impede signifi-
cant deforestation in the future (Richards et al 2017),
without putting into question the efficiency of conser-
vation initiatives in other biomes of Brazil. Because the
5
Environ. Res. Lett. 12 (2017) 094001
0
0 10 20 30 40 50
(a)
% of Native Vegetation Cover
60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 40 50
(b)
% of Native Vegetation Cover
60 70 80 90 100
0 10 20 30 40 50
(c)
% of Native Vegetation Cover
60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 40 50
(d)
% of Native Vegetation Cover
60 70 80 90 100
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 C
le
ar
in
g
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 C
le
ar
in
g
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 C
le
ar
in
g
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 C
le
ar
in
g
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
CI at 95%
age < 44 age < 44 & no ag loan age < 44 & ag loan>0
age 45-56 & ag loan>0
age 57-66 & ag loan>0
age 45-56 & no ag loan
age 57-66 & no ag loan
age > 66 & no ag loan
age 45-56
age 57-66
age > 66
loan for ag=0 loan for ag>0predicted probability
age > 66 & ag loan>0
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Cerrado remains overshadowed by the Amazon forest
and is largely privately owned, the deforestation taking
place there is especially difficult to halt; thus it pro-
ceeds without significant pushback both domestically
and internationally (Lahsen et al 2016).
We have shown that the existing percentage of
native vegetation which smallholders have on their
properties is positively and significantly associated with
their intention to deforest. On the one hand, this points
to ahigher likelihoodof clearing inhighly forested areas
that might be critical areas for biodiversity and carbon
storage and where the impacts of habitat fragmenta-
tion caused by agricultural expansion may be severe
(Chaplin-Kramer et al 2015). On the other hand, our
results also show that upon CAR registration those
smallholders with less native vegetation than the legal
cut-off appear less inclined to clear areas for cultiva-
tion, possibly as a result of their increased awareness
of the Forest Code. Because many smallholders have
more native vegetation than the legal cut-off and they
intend to clear the excess area, our results indicate that
the mandated proportion of 20% native vegetation on
rural properties in the Cerrado outside of the Legal
Amazon is too low. Specific state regulations, such as
the state of Piauı´’s stipulation that an increased propor-
tion of native vegetation (30%) is to be preserved, are
important steps in the right direction, yet in the case of
Piauı´ it is still too low considering the high average per-
centage of native vegetation cover in our sample (70%).
Our results also show that smallholders with loans for
agricultural production are more likely to clear land.
Given that credit access tends to be also positively asso-
ciatedwithpoverty reduction (Burgess andPande2005,
Conning and Udry 2007) and the poverty rates in the
Cerrado area are high, restricting access to rural credit
is not a viable option.
We argue that there is a need for additional
mechanisms built into nation-wide environmental reg-
istration schemes, like the CAR, as the CRA system for
trading excess areas of native vegetation is currently
functioning poorly, partly because of smallholders’
unfamiliaritywith the system.Suchmechanismsshould
(1) account for the existing land use by, for example,
providing additional (monetary) incentives to those
smallholders with more native vegetation than the
legal requirements to maintain that vegetation, and
(2) establish conditioning measures for granting credit
access to younger smallholders, in particular, and/or
livestock producers with a high percentage of native
vegetation in their properties. Such conditioning mea-
sures could, for example, be participation in mutual
monitoring groups or/and a declaration presented by
6
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the borrower stating any planned land use change.
Moreover, because the CAR rests on self-declared reg-
istration of native vegetation cover, more stringent
verification of the registry data might be necessary to
assure that the CAR can actually facilitate enforcement
(L’Roe et al 2016).
We acknowledge that the actual land use deci-
sions remain to be seen since our results are based
on smallholders’ statement of intended deforestation
behavior after CAR registration rather than actual
behavior. Nevertheless, understanding the realities of
deforestation at the property level is a necessary com-
ponent of large-scale environmental initiatives aimed
at reducing smallholders’ deforestation behavior.
Because our micro-level data has enabled us to disen-
tangle the factors linked to smallholders’ deforestation
behavior following registration for one of the largest
environmental programs in theworld, aprogramwhich
is serving as an example for potential programs alike
in other countries, our findings should be of broad
interest for futuredesignsof environmental registration
initiatives.
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